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FACTS
Plaintiffs, three white females, applied for admission to the University of
Georgia's ("UGA" or "the university") Fall 1999 freshmen class.' All three
plaintiffs were denied admission to UGA.2 Thereafter, plaintiffs brought suit
against UGA alleging that the university's intentional use of race and gender
in its admissions decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and Title IX.3 Plaintiffs requested the
following relief: "an injunction compelling their admission to UGA;
prospective injunctive relief against future use of race and gender in
admissions process; certification of compliance with requested relief; and
damages."
UGA denied the plaintiffs' claims and stated that its admissions policy did
not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race.5 Rather, UGA asserted that
its admissions policy served a compelling state interest to promote, obtain, and
maintain a diverse student body and was narrowly tailored to survive a strict
scrutiny analysis.6
History of the Affirmative Action Policy at the University of Georgia
UGA was in existence for 160 years before it admitted the first African-
American students in 1961.' In 1969, Office of Civil Rights ("OCR")
determined that the university maintained a dual-track education system based
on race that perpetuated racial segregation within the university system.'
Consequently, OCR ordered the university's Board of Regents to desegregate
its classrooms and to implement an affirmative action program to alleviate the
discrimination present at the university.9
In 1989, OCR lifted UGA's mandatory desegregation and affirmative
action regulations.'0 OCR concluded that UGA had substantially implemented
I. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2001).
2. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1237.
3. Id. at 1238. Note, race discrimination is the sole issue on appeal.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1237.
6. Id. at 1237.
7. Id. at 1239.
8. Id. at 1239-1240.
9. Id. at 1240.
10. Id.
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the prescribed remedial measures and was in compliance with Title VI." OCR
warned UGA that despite its formal lift of the desegregation regulations, UGA
was still prohibited from discriminating against applicants "on the basis of
race, color or national origin" in any of its future admissions policies. 2
From 1990 to 1995, UGA administered two different admissions policies
to applicants based on whether the applicant identified herself as "black" or
"non-black."1 3  Both policies were based on objective academic criteria,
however the pre-determined minimum scores for "black" applicants were
lower than the minimum scores for "non-black" applicants. 4 In 1995, UGA
changed its race-based, dual-track admissions policy in response to the
growing concern throughout the country regarding the constitutionality of
racial classifications and admissions policies. 5 UGA introduced its new three-
step admissions policy in 1996.16 This policy was in use when plaintiffs
applied for admissions to UGA in 1999 and is the policy that plaintiffs
challenged in their suit against the university. "
UGA's Fall 1999 Admissions Policy
The "First Notice" stage of UGA's admissions policy used a strictly
objective academic criteria to evaluate each applicant. 8 An applicant's race
was not considered in the First Notice stage of the admissions process. 9 The
Admissions Committee considered an applicant's Scholastic Aptitude Test
("SAT") and academic index ("Al'?).2 ° If an applicant's SAT score and Al
exceeded pre-determined minima, UGA offered the applicant admission. 2' To
gain admission to UGA's fall 1999 freshman class at the First Notice stage,
applicants had to achieve "(1) AIs of 2.86 or above; and (2) SAT scores of at





15. Id. Notably, in 1995, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States ruled the University
of Texas' admissions policy which classified applicants on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. Hopwood v. Tex, 78 F.3d 932,944 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996). It seems highly probable that the Hopwood decision influenced UGA to re-think its
admissions policy at that time.




20. Id. The SAT tests students' abilities in both Verbal and Math skills, with one essay. Students
are scored separately for each portion of the test and then their scores are combined to give them a total
evaluative score. "The Al is a statistic that weighs and combines an applicant's SAT scores and GPA."
21. ld. at 1240.
22. Id. at 1241.
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to meet the requirements, those with AIs and SAT scores above a particular
number proceeded to the next step of UGA's admissions evaluation process.23
In 1998 through 1999, applicants with an Al above 2.40 and SAT scores
totaling over 950 were passed onto the second stage; those applicants with
scores below these two minima were rejected. 4
In stage two of UGA's admissions process, the university calculated a
Total Student Index ("TSI") for each applicant.25 The TSI was composed of
each applicant's "weighted academic, extracurricular, demographic, and other
factors.,26 During the TSI stage, UGA "expressly consider[ed] an applicant's
race" for the first time in the admissions process.27 Similar to the First Notice
stage, applicants whose TSI scores met a particular pre-set minimum threshold
were admitted to UGA; applicants whose TSI scores fell below the pre-set
minima were rejected.28 Applicants with scores between the pre-set minimum
and the pre-set threshold passed on to the third stage where admissions officers
would evaluate each applicant on an individual basis.29
The university's fall 1999 criteria for the TSI stage considered a total of
twelve factors, with a maximum score of 8.15.30 An applicant's TSI is
calculated based on four objective academic factors- (1) SAT score; (2) GPA;
(3) Al score; and (4) curriculum quality - for a maximum 5.40 points
(approximately 67%) of the maximum points available at the TSI stage.3'
In addition to an applicant's academic performance, already considered in the
First Notice stage, five leadership/activity or other factors, based on
information self-reported by the [applicant], affected an applicant's chances
of gaining admission to UGA.32 The following leadership/activity factors were
considered for applicants attempting to gain admission to UGA's Fall 1999
freshmen class: "parent or sibling ties to UGA, hours spent on extracurricular
activities, hours spent on summer work, hours spent on school-year work, and,
first-generation college.33 Applicants could gain a total of 1.5 points (18%)
toward their TSI based on these leadership/activity factors.34
Finally, three demographic factors - "race/ethnicity (i.e. non-Caucasian),
23. Id. at 1240.
24. Id. at 1241.





30. Id. at 1241.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Note, of the five leadership/activity factors, UGA gave the greatest weight (0.5 points) to
"both parents no college education."
34. Id.
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gender [preference was given to male applicants], and Georgia residency" -
were considered at the TSI stage and gave applicants who qualified up to an
additional 1.25 points, (15%) towards their final TSI.35 Applicants who
voluntarily defined themselves on their application as non-Caucasian - defined
as "Asian or Pacific Islander, African-American, Hispanic, American-Indian,
or Multi-cultural" - received 0.5 points toward their total TSI.36
According to the Fall 1999 criteria, UGA admitted all candidates with a
TSI of 4.93 or above.37 Applicants with a TSI below 4.66 were rejected.38
Applicants with TSIs between 4.66 and 4.92 proceeded to the final Edge Read
("ER") stage.39
During the ER stage, admissions officers evaluated the remaining
applicants on an individual, qualitative basis, rather than on a mechanical basis
found solely on an applicant's academic scores and basic application form."
Each remaining applicant in the ER stage begins with a score of zero, and as
the admissions officers discover qualities that might have been overlooked
during the two previous stages, an applicant's score is increased." The race
of an applicant does not affect his or her score in the ER stage." '42 Applicants
with a score above a certain number were admitted; those with scores below
that number were rejected. 3
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the discrepancies in Caucasian
and non-Caucasian applicants' scores and contended that had they received
additional 0.5 points awarded to applicants of color, they too would have been
offered admission to UGA's Fall 1999 freshmen class.4 As stated before,
UGA's Fall 1999 scoring criteria required an applicant to have a TSI score of
4.93 or higher. However, due to the 0.5 points awarded to non-Caucasian
students based on race, it was possible for a non-Caucasian applicant to gain
admission to UGA with a TSI of 4.43, instead of the 4.93.45 Because non-
Caucasian applicants could qualify for an automatic 0.5 points towards their
TSI score by virtue of identifying themselves as non-Caucasian, the non-
35. Id.
36. Id. The appellate court referred to the 0.5 points reserved for persons designated as non-
Caucasian as the "race factor" or "race bonus." Johnson, 263 F.2d at 1241 n.6. Because this terminology
may be misleading it is not used in this case note.
37. Id. at 1241.
38. Id. at 1241-2342.
39. Id. at 1242.
40. Id. at 1241.
41. Id. at 1240,1241.
42. Id. at 1241.
43. Id. The court's opinion did not state the requisite ER score for an applicant to gain admission
to UGA's fall 1999 freshman class.
44. Id. at 1242.
45. Id.
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Caucasian applicants could gain admission to UGA with a TSI of 4.43 and not
the higher score of 4.93. Moreover, non-Caucasian applicants could advance
to the ER stage with a TSI of 4.16, rather than 4.66, also as a result of the 0.5
points awarded non-Caucasian applicants.46
Procedural History
The district court concluded that UGA's Fall 1999 freshman admissions
policy violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d,
and consequently the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47
The district court rejected UGA's argument that Justice Powell declared
student body diversity to be a compelling state interest in his lone opinion in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke' ("Bakke").49 The district
court also concluded that the Supreme Court's post-Bakke decisions expressed
"hostility" toward classifying diversity as a compelling interest.5"
The district court disregarded the testimony of former UGA President
Charles Knapp regarding the numerous benefits and attributes of student body
diversity as "syllogism and speculation"'" though there was no evidence
presented to refute Knapp's testimony." The district court's opinion
concluded that diversity on UGA's campus was not a compelling state
interest.53 Consequently, the district court concluded that UGA violated the
plaintiffs' rights to Equal Protection and thus granted plaintiffs' motions for
summary judgment.54
The university appealed on grounds that its freshman admissions policy
did not violate plaintiffs' equal protection rights." In its appeal, the university
argued that its policy was narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (ruling that that a race-conscious admissions programs at a state-funded
higher education facility failed the two-part strict scrutiny test of the Equal Protection Amendment, and
hence was unlawful. Justice Powell cast the deciding the deciding vot in a sharply divided court. Chief
Justice Burger, along with Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist concluded that the race-conscious
admissions program at University of California at Davis Medical School was unconstitutional however they
did not address the issue of whether race can ever be a factor in making admissions decisions. A second
plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, White, and Blackmun upheld the
Medical School's race-conscious admissions program because its purpose was to rectify past societal racial
discrimination. Id. at 362.
49. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1239.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. quoting Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362
(S.D. Ga 2000) at 1372.
52. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1239.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1237.
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interest of promoting student body diversity and hence survives strict scrutiny
analysis.56 Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's refusal to grant their
request for prospective injunctive relief against UGA's use of race in its
admissions process and the district court's de-certification of plaintiffs' case
as a class action lawsuit.57
HOLDING
The Eleventh Circuit Appellate Court affirmed the district court's ruling
for summary judgment, but on different grounds.58 The district court ruled that
UGA's attempt to obtain a diverse student body did not constitute a
compelling state interest and therefore was unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny analysis.59 However, the Eleventh Circuit declined to determine
whether student body diversity might ever qualify as a compelling state
interest.60 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that UGA's Fall 1999
admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve the university's interest
of student body diversity, and therefore the policy failed the two-part, strict
scrutiny test.61 Throughout the Appellate Court's opinion, Judge Marcus,
writing for the majority, indicated that the confusion surrounding the
constitutionality of racial classifications in university admissions policies,
particularly whether a diverse student body may ever qualify as a compelling
state interest in order to survive application of the strict scrutiny standard
would be best handled by the Supreme Court.62
ANALYSIS
Judge Marcus explained that the court must review the district court's
grant of summary judgment de novo, pursuant to Rule 56.63 Hence, the
appellate court must apply the same standards implemented by the district
court in its analysis of the case.' Summary judgment is awarded to a moving
party in cases where "no genuine issues as to any material fact [are present]"
56. Id.
57. Idat 1243.
58. Id. at 1264.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1250.
61. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224, (holding that strict scrutiny analysis is
required of all racial classifications - "any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any
governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.").
62. Id. at 1250, 1251.
63. FED R. Civ. P. 56(c).
64. Johnson, 263 f.3d at 1242.
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and thus the moving party is entitled to a "judgment as a matter of law., 65 The
appellate court, in reviewing a grant for summary judgment, must analyze the
factual inferences of the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, UGA.66 Furthermore, UGA must satisfy its burden of proof in order to
defeat the lower court's summary judgment ruling according to Rule 56(C).
67
Specifically, UGA must prove that its Fall 1999 freshmen admissions policy
survived a strict scrutiny analysis as required for Equal Protection cases.68
In regard to the substance of the case, the Eleventh Circuit had to
determine whether UGA's Fall 1999 freshman admissions policy which
instituted racial classifications "[served] a compelling interest, and if so,
whether UGA ha[d] met its burden of showing that its policy [was] narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. ' 69 As stated in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,70 government-authorized racial classification must be strictly scrutinized
under the law 7' because "classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race
'are by their very nature odious to a free people."' 72 Racial classifications
survive strict scrutiny analysis and are constitutional only if"(1) the racial
classification serves a compelling state interest, and (2) it is narrowly tailored
to further that interest.",13 UGA, as the proponent of its race-based admissions
program, had the burden of proving that its policy met both requirements of
the strict scrutiny standard. 74 As the appellate court noted, "UGA's burden
[was], therefore, substantial."75
First, the appellate court asked, "when, if ever, may student body diversity
be a compelling interest? '76 Yet, rather than answer this question, the court
invoked the principle of judicial restraint 77 and refused to answer its own
question. 78 The courtjustified its action by concluding that UGA's admissions
policy failed the second prong of strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly
tailored to further a compelling interest. Consequently, the court had no
65. Id., quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
66. Id. at 1243. See, Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11 th Cir. 1999).
67. FED R. CIv. P. 56(c).
68. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243. F.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986).
69. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1242.
70. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) at 224. ("Adarand")
71. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224).




76. Id. at 1244.
77. Id. at 1245; see Burton v. United State, 196 U.S. 283 (1905). See also, Fla. Ass'n of Rehab.
Facilities, Inc. v. State ofFla. Dept. of Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1227 n.14 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(applying principle that "constitutional questions should not be resolved unless necessary to the decision.")
(emphasis added).
78. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1251.
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reason to examine the issue further.79 Instead, the court punted the issue to the
Supreme Court stating that the "great importance [of whether student body
diversity is a compelling government interest] warrant[ed] consideration by the
Supreme Court. °
The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation of Bakke8 - Compelling
Interest Undefined
While the Eleventh Circuit avoided answering its own question of whether
student body diversity could ever be a compelling state interest, it nevertheless
addressed UGA's use of Bakke as justification of the university's race-
conscious admissions policy. 2 However, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately
concluded that the Supreme Court's now famous holding in Bakke did not
apply to the case at hand.83
In Bakke, the Supreme Court struck down the University of California at
Davis Medical School's (the "medical school") use of a dual-track, quota
system for admitting non-white students to achieve a diverse student body."
A fractured Supreme Court issued a confusing plurality opinion that lower
courts have been grappling with since the day it was issued.85
Notably, lower courts across the nation have issued numerous conflicting
and confusing opinions regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions policies in higher education as a result of their (mis-)
understandings of Justice Powell's multifaceted Bakke opinion.86 In Bakke,
Justice Powell joined Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart and
Rehnquist to affirm the California Supreme Court's ruling that the medical
school's admissions system was unconstitutional. 7 Yet, a different grouping
79. Id. at 1245.
80. Id.
81. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
82. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1244-1251.
83. ld, 263 F.3d at 1248, n. 12 (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994) "No
binding rule may be taken from a fractured decision and ... is ultimately not useful" (citing, Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)))..
84. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1246.
85. Id. at 1249, n.13. Courts across the nation, both trial and appellate, have reached conflicting
conclusions regarding the use of racial classifications as a result of the High Court's amorphous holding in
Bakke. See e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that under
Bakke, student body diversity "is a compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict
scrutiny."); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (appeal pending) (stating that
"Bakke does not stand for the proposition that a university's desire to assemble a racially diverse student
body is a compelling state interest.") Grutter has since been joined with Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp.
2d 811 (E.D. Mi. 2001); oral arguments in the combined cases were heard, en banc, at the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, on December 6, 2001.
86. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1249 n.13.
87. Id. .3d at 1246.
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of Justices composed of Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined to "reverse the California Supreme Court's total prohibition
on the university's consideration of race in admissions."88 Thus, Justice
Powell was the only vote in both majority opinions.89
Justice Powell began his Bakke opinion by affirming the lower court's
conclusion that the Medical School's dual-track quota admissions system was
unlawful.9" Yet two sentences thereafter, Justice Powell also concluded that
consideration of an applicant's race for admissions purposes may be
permissible.9' In one instance, Justice Powell stated
If [the medical school's] purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic
origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but
as facially invalid. 92
But then, Justice Powell obfuscated this statement and wrote that the medical
school's goal to attain a diverse student body was "clearly a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education ' 93 as ensured by the
First Amendment.94  Hence, Justice Powell's Bakke conveyed two
incompatible conclusions: first, that racial classifications for the purpose of
attaining a diverse student population is unlawful, and second, that student
body diversity is an acceptable goal for institutions of higher education.95
In the case at hand, UGA urged the appellate court to consider Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion regarding the permissibility of race conscious
admissions as binding precedent and hold that UGA's goal of attaining student
body diversity is a compelling state interest capable of withstanding strict
scrutiny analysis. 96 The Eleventh Circuit rejected UGA's argument and
interpreted Justice Powell's opinion as holding that while a state may have a
legitimate interest in promoting diverse student bodies in its universities,
effectuation of that interest must be by a "properly devised" plan.97 Justice
Powell, in Bakke, had cited Harvard University's "flexible" admissions plan
as an acceptable admissions policy that treats race as one factor among many
88. Id.
89. Id.






96. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1244.
97. Id.
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factors considered in making admissions decisions.9" The Eleventh Circuit
court found that although Justice Powell did acknowledge student body
diversity as a compelling interest in Bakke, Justice Powell confined his holding
to very narrow circumstances which were absent in UGA's case.99
The Eleventh Circuit also concluded that Justice Powell's opinion was not
binding precedent because no other Justice expressly joined his opinion.' 0
Four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, found that the medical school's
admissions policy was acceptable on the grounds that the policy's purpose was
to remedy past societal discrimination.' From their point of view, admissions
policies aimed at remedying past societal discrimination were "sufficiently
important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs."' 2 But,
Justice Stevens, in his opinion, declined to address the use of race-conscious
admissions policies,'0 3 and instead, based his conclusions on Title VI
criteria."° Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held that Justice Powell's opinion
was not binding because it lacked the support of his brethren.0 5
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit applied the principle that "when a
fragmented Court decides a case... the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those [m]embers who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.""'1 Under this principle, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that Justice Brennan's opinion was not founded on the narrowest principles
available."0 7 Rather, Justice Brennan's opinion advocated the application of
intermediate scrutiny upon racial classifications, thus holding that student body
diversity was an important interest, but not a compelling interest that could
survive strict scrutiny analysis.108 Hence, only Justice Powell's opinion
directly addressed student body diversity under the terms of strict scrutiny and
therefore qualified as the narrowest opinion supporting the notion that racial
classifications violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '9
The one definitive conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit did assess
regarding student body diversity was that its status as a "compelling interest
98. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
99. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1246.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1246-47.
102. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362).
103. Id. at 1247.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1246.
106. Id. at 1247 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
107. Id. at 263 F.3d.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1246.
[Vol. 8:1
2002] Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia 171
is an open question in the Supreme Court and in our Court.""'  Like Justice
Powell, the Eleventh Circuit left open the possibility that student body
diversity may qualify as a compelling interest when supported by a strong
record."' However the absence of a thorough, unified opinion regarding race-
conscious admissions policies in recent jurisprudence supports the notion that
the Supreme Court disfavors such policies and therefore, these policies would
likely be ruled unconstitutional."'
Narrowly Tailored
The Eleventh Circuit based its entire decision on the conclusion that
UGA's admissions policy was not tailored narrowly enough to survive strict
judicial scrutiny.'" 3 However, the court noted that the opportunity to define the
boundaries of "narrowly tailored" in respect to university admissions policies
has not arisen in its courtroom or in the courtroom of the Supreme Court." 4
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the contours identified in United States
v. Paradise,"5 an employment case involving an affirmative action policy
designed to remedy past discrimination." 1
6
Under Paradise, five factors must be considered when evaluating whether
a state racial classification is narrowly tailored." 7  The Eleventh Circuit
adjusted these factors, slightly, to apply to university race-conscious
admissions policies." 8  The revised Paradise guidelines" 9 require courts
evaluating race-conscious admissions policy to ask the following questions:
(1) whether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way that does not
take sufficient account of the different contributions to diversity that
individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the policy fully and fairly takes
account of race-neutral factors which may contribute to a diverse student
body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to
members of the favored racial groups; and (4) whether the school has
genuinely considered and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for
110. Id. at 1250.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1248.
113. Id. at 1237.
114. Id. at 1252. The Eleventh Circuit does cite two cases that address the boundaries of narrowly
tailored in employment scenarios.
115. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
116. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
117. Johnson, 263 F.3d 1252..
118. Id.
119. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.
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creating student body diversity."'2 °
After the court applied the adjusted Paradise factors to UGA's admissions
policy it concluded that UGA's policy was too mechanical and rigid to qualify
as a narrowly tailored admissions policy.'2 ' Moreover, the court concluded
that UGA's admissions policy was deficient because it "excluded many race-
neutral factors that would reflect an applicant's potential contributions to
diversity."'22
The court found particular dissatisfaction with the TSI stage of UGA's
policy. The court found that UGA's system of awarding points in the TSI
stage did not take into consideration factors such as economic backgrounds of
applicants or applicants' knowledge of foreign languages.'23 The court felt
that qualities other than race or in addition to race would better foster a diverse
student body at UGA than its existing more generalized race-conscious
admissions policy.124 The court pointed out that under the TSI stage, UGA
evaluates an applicant's work hours and not the quality or purpose of the work
involved.'25 The court asserted that if UGA wants a diverse student population
then it cannot do so by placing capricious or mechanical stereotypes on its
applicants; the court declared that UGA must "shoulder the burden of fully and
fairly analyzing applicants as individuals and not merely as members of groups
when deciding their likely contribution to student body diversity."' 26
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit found that UGA's admissions policy as
a whole to be arbitrary and disproportionate.' 27 UGA failed to offer evidence
to defending its policy of granting every non-white applicant 0.5 points toward
their TSI.'28 The 0.5 point granted to non-white applicants was the highest
point award besides the 1.0 point given to an applicant's SAT scores. 2 9 UGA
also did not offer evidence that justified its policy to award an applicant more
points for race than for working forty hours per week. 30 Hence, the Eleventh
Circuit found UGA's admissions policy to be both inflexible and unreasonable
in its application.'
3'
UGA defended its TSI stage, particularly the 0.5 point awarded to non-
120. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1253.





126. Id. at 1256.
127. Id. at 1257.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1257-58.
131. Id.
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white applicants, by arguing that few white applicants were affected by the
policy. 32 UGA demonstrated that 85% of its Fall 1999 freshmen class had
gained admission to the University in the "race-neutral,"'' 33 First Notice stage
of the admissions process.'34 The Eleventh Circuit, however, rejected UGA's
defense because UGA failed to provide any evidence to support its assertions
that white applicants have not been injured by the university's admissions
policy. 135 Moreover, the court held that the case at hand undermined UGA's
defense and offered support to the court's conclusion that white applicants had
indeed been injured by UGA's admissions policy.'36
Lastly, UGA failed to demonstrate that its admissions policy considered
race-neutral factors, such as the economic or demographic dispositions of its
applicants.'37 UGA did not present evidence at trial to demonstrate that it had
considered using race-neutral measures in its admissions process to promote
diversity. 3 The court criticized the university for its short-sightedness and
stated, "it is beyond dispute" that race-neutral factors, such as financial
incentives to admittees from less advantaged homes, could create a diverse
student body. 39 In support of its recommendations, the court stated that
"while strict scrutiny does not require exhaustion of every possible...
alternative, 'it does require 'serious, good faith considerations of race-neutral
alternatives,' either prior to or in conjunction with implementation of an
affirmative action plan."' 4° Ironically, the court concluded that UGA's Fall
1999 freshman admissions policy was narrow-minded, rather than narrowly-
tailored;' 4' the court found the policy to be too limited in its scope to qualify
as narrowly tailored under a strict scrutiny analysis.'42 The court held that for
a policy to be narrowly tailored it must accomplish its purpose with the
greatest precision and efficiency than any alternative means.4 3 Hence, UGA
did not develop a narrowly tailored policy that withstood strict scrutiny
analysis. Since, the court struck down UGA's admissions policy on the
grounds that it was not tailored narrowly enough to survive a strict scrutiny








140. Id. quoting Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1571 (1 ith Cir., 1990) at 1571.
141. Johnson, 263 F.3d 1260.
142. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd of Educ., 476 U.S. 267(1986), "The term 'narrowly tailored'...
requires consideration of whether lawful alternatives and less restrictive means could have been used... The
classification at issue must 'fit' with greater precision than any alternative means.").
143. Id. at 1260.
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analysis the court was not obligated to determine whether a diverse student
body qualified as a compelling interest under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as
binding precedent that a diverse student body could be a compelling state
interest ifproperly established. 145 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that the Supreme Court's holding in Bakke offered little assistance to its task
of determining whether racial classifications may be used in university
admissions programs.' 46 Justice Marcus made it clear that the question of
whether student body diversity could ever constitute a compelling interest is
a question for the Supreme Court.
47
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion is a disappointment, legally and socially.
The opinion fails to explore the credibility of race-conscious admissions
policies in higher education and instead rests its reasoning on the university's
failure to limit the definition of race to fit within a narrowly-tailored policy.
Although the record does support a finding that UGA's admissions policy was
not narrowly tailored and hence failed the second prong of a strict scrutiny
analysis, the court's analysis is as weak as UGA's record in support of its
attempts to narrowly define race for admissions procedures.
Further, the court's opinion gives greater support to the theory of material
determinism'48 - the notion that the white elite who benefit materially from
racism and working class whites who benefit psychologically from racism
have little incentive to eradicate racism. 149 The Eleventh Circuit's opinion
emphasizes society's resistance to change and progress. The court minimizes
the educational benefit provided by the intermingling of persons of various
racial and ethnic backgrounds who would not otherwise interact with one
another; the mere potential for persons of different racial backgrounds to co-
exist fosters tolerance, awareness and an appreciation for difference. Such
teachings would greatly benefit UGA's student body, as well as society, as a
whole.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1261.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1251.
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The Reindeer Rule Applied to UGA 's Race-Conscious Admissions Policy
While Justice Marcus states that UGA's admissions policy could not be
upheld because it was not narrowly tailored so as to survive a strict scrutiny
standard, his analysis is shortsighted. In an attempt to reverse the growing
trend to eliminate many race-conscious admissions policies across the United
States, Justice Marcus could have upheld UGA's admissions policy as a right
preserved under the First Amendment of the Constitution, as first recognized
by Justice Powell in his Bakke opinion. 5 Specifically, Justice Marcus could
have applied the First Amendment "reindeer rule" to the present case and
hence secularize the impact of race on UGA's admissions process.
The Reindeer Rule, first recognized in Lynch v. Donnelly,"'5 recognizes
that displays of religious symbols did not violate the Establishment Clause if
secular objects accompanied them and secular figurines subdued the religious
elements of the display.' Hence, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Lynch v. Donnelly, many lower courts upheld creche displays so long as they
did not stand alone.' The theory behind the Reindeer Rule is based on the
notion that a creche's religious significance will be suppressed if surrounded
by secular images and hence the risk that such display may be interpreted as
the government's endorsement of Christianity is decreased.'54
Pursuant to the Reindeer Rule developed in Lynch v. Donnelly, 155 the court
in Johnson could have developed a similar principal that would have subdued
the significance of race in university admissions and possibly upheld UGA's
race-conscious admissions policy under the First Amendment. According to
UGA's admissions policy, three demographic characteristics were examined
in the TSI stage of the admissions process; (1) race; (2) gender; and (3)
Georgia residency. 6 Given that an applicant's race is one factor out of three,
the Eleventh Circuit could have applied the Reindeer Rule to hold that those
150. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (finding that a university's attempt to create a diverse student body is
"clearly a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education").
151. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
152. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) analyzing the constitutionality of the nativity scene
owned and maintained and displayed on the government property; see Joshua D. Zarroa, Of Crosses and
Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L.
REv. 477, 495 (1986).
153. See American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (holding that a cr6che may be displayed since it was accompanied by seasonal figurines.); see also,
McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2nd cir. 1984) affd mem. by an equally divided court sub nom. Board
of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985), (holding that a criche could not be erected in a public park
if unaccompanied by a Santa Clause, reindeer or other secular figurines.).
154. See, George M. Janocsko, Beyond the "Plastic Reindeer Rule:: The Curious Case of County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 445 (1990).
155. See, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
156. Johnson 263 F.2d at 1241 citing Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (1984),
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two secular traits tempered the applicant's one race-based characteristic and
consequently, such admissions policy would have been permissible.
Remedy Past Discrimination
The greatest disappointment regarding the near extinction of race-
conscious admissions policies across the United States is the courts' failure to
recognize and honor a university's First Amendment right to select its student
body based on its own criteria. Specifically, Justice Powell stated in Bakke
that a university's attempt to create a diverse student body is "clearly a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education"' as
ensured by the First Amendment.158 Administrators, professors and deans
alike from various universities across the nation have testified to the benefits
of a diverse student body.'5 9 Diversity - the principal that a multitude of
varying perspectives, persons and beliefs - is essential to one's education and
development, particularly in an environment such as higher education.
Universities have both the opportunity and the responsibility to create an
environment where differing viewpoints may intermingle to better educate
their students through tolerance and appreciation for "the other." It is
undeniable that UGA's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to meet
a strict scrutiny analysis, however the court delivered a shortsighted and
deficient decision.
As a result of the recent cases finding race-conscious admissions policies
unconstitutional, courts are deterring universities from promoting student body
diversity regardless of methodology. The effect of such decisions can be seen
in the California and Texas school systems where enrollment by students of
color has decreased substantially." ° The irony is painful. The policies once
established to promote student body diversity are now the very tools being
used to dismantle integrated school systems. The Supreme Court must now
interfere with educational policy and clarify the holding in Bakke, hopefully
to the benefit of student body diversity.
157. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
158. Id.
159. See, Johnson 263 F.3d at 1239; Grutter v. University of Michigan, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 827
(E.D. Mi. 2001) (appeal pending) (student body diversity within the law school "enrich(es) everyone's
education and thus make(s) the law school class stronger than the sum of its parts." See also, Smith v.
University of Washington Law School, 233 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Educational diversity is a
compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures.")
160. See, Ana J. Matosantos and Melissa C. Chiu, Opportunities Lost, The State of Public Sector
Affirmative Action in Post Proposition California, Executive Summary, at. 3 (Nov. 1998). See also, Sue
Anne Pressley, Texas Campus Attracts Fewer Minorities, Washington Post, Aug. 1997, at Al (the first-year
entering law school class will have four African American students, down from forty, and twenty-six
Hispanic Americans, down from sixty, in most years.)
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